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MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC.:
REDEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE

FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
VADIM VAPNYARt

The doctrine of trademark dilution traces its origin to a
thesis by Frank I. Schechter,' who suggested that the
contemporary trademark law would not provide sufficient
protection to trademarks in the future. 2 He proposed to abandon
the old model of legal trademark safeguards and recognized that
"the
preservation
of
the
uniqueness
of
a
trademark... constitute[s] the only rational basis for its
protection."3 This protection came in the form of preventing
"dilution" of the mark, which Schechter defined as depreciation
of the "uniqueness" of the senior mark resulting from junior use
of a substantially similar mark.4
Schechter's proposals
drastically departed from the traditional legal doctrine
protecting trademarks. 5 Although trademark dilution protection
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2001,
New York University.
I See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927); see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,

U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028 (2d Cir. 1989) (referring to Frank Schechter as the
"father of the dilution theory").
2 See Schechter, supra note 1, at 824 ("We have seen that the proper expansion
of trademark law has been hampered by obsolete conceptions both as to the function
of a trademark and as to the need for its protection."). Under the contemporary
trademark law, preventing misuse of a mark was possible only when there was

"actual confusion"; this was often too late because such misuse may have already

substantially injured the mark owner. Id. at 825.
3 Id. at 831.
4 See id. at 825-26. The term "junior" refers to a subsequent user of a mark
that diluted a famous mark and is usually the defendant in a dilution suit. Paul
Edward Kim, Comment, Preventing Dilution of the Federal Trademark DilutionAct:
Why the FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 731 n.59
(2001). The term "senior" refers to the holder of the famous mark that is being
diluted and usually denotes the plaintiff. Id.
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999) ("This radical dilution proposal,
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was never adopted exactly as Schechter envisioned it,
Massachusetts passed the first antidilution statute in 1947.6 By
the time the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) 7 was
passed in 1995, twenty-five states had their own antidilution
statutes. 8 For the first time, the FTDA allowed a mark owner to
bring a dilution action in federal court. 9 In addition, the FTDA
promised to provide much needed uniformity to the diverse
landscape of antidilution jurisprudence that developed since its
first codification. 10 Unfortunately, the FTDA has sown confusion

whose practical effect if fully adopted would be to create as the whole of trademarkprotection law property rights in gross in suitably 'unique' marks, never has been
legislatively adopted by any jurisdiction in anything approaching that extreme
form.").
6 Id.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). The FTDA provides in pertinent part:
1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark
or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such
other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a
mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but
not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
8 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030
("[A]pproximately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution."); see also
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454 ("Over the next fifty years, other states followed suit
and by 1996, when the President signed the federal Act into law, around half of the
states had done so.").
9 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 ("H.R. 1295 would add a new section 43(c) to
the Lanham Act ...to create a federal cause of action to protect famous marks from
unauthorized users.").
10 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (noting the discrepancy between the
nationwide use of famous marks and the limited, "patch-quilt system of protection"
provided by the states).
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and doubt among the courts of appeals, which has resulted in
many varying interpretations and applications of the statute."
Controversy has focused upon whether or not the plaintiff needs
to show actual harm in order to demonstrate dilution of its
mark.12 In 1999, Congress tried to alleviate the problem by
passing the Trademark Amendments Act (TAA).1 3 Although the
legislation attempted to silence the confused voices of the
judiciary,14 the statute failed to resolve whether a showing of
actual harm was necessary to state a claim.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court confronted the
issue of actual harm in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 15 on
appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Prior to
Moseley, the circuits were split. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,16
held that a plaintiff needed to demonstrate "actual economic
harm to the famous mark's economic value;"'17 however, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and held in
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.18 that actual harm was not a
11 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999)
(requiring the plaintiff to show, in addition to the other necessary elements, that the
mark is distinctive), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.
Ct. 1115 (2003); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.
1998) (requiring the plaintiff to prove four elements: "(1) the mark is famous; (2) the
defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's
use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark
dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify
and distinguish goods and services").
12 Compare Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 (construing the causation
requirement embedded in the FTDA to demand a more stringent standard than
"likelihood of dilution" and requiring the plaintiff to show actual harm as a result of
the dilution), with Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-25 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's
literal reading of FTDA in Ringling Bros. and opting for the "likelihood of dilution"
standard).
13 See H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 4 (1999), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030 ("H.R. 1565 makes significant improvements in trademark law... [It]
provides holders of famous marks with a right to oppose or seek cancellation of a
mark that would cause dilution ... [It] seeks to clarify that in passing the Dilution
Act, Congress did intend to allow for injunctive relief and/or damages against a
defendant .... ).
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 5 ("Since the enactment of the Dilution Act,
federal courts have grappled with how to apply the statute.").
15 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
16 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
17 Id. at 461.
18 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret
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requirement.1 9 The Sixth Circuit, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley,20 followed the Second Circuit and its decision in
Nabisco.21 The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not need
to show actual harm and decided the case in favor of V Secret by
applying a more lax standard. 22
In Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue,Inc.,23 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Sixth Circuit and held that the FTDA required actual harm. 24
The importance and historical significance of Moseley lie in the
fact that the case finally resolved the doctrine of the federal
antidilution legislation after almost five years of diverging views
among the circuits.
In 1998, the defendant in Moseley opened a store called
"Victor's Secret" in Elizabeth Town, Kentucky, and began selling
a variety of goods, such as lingerie, adult videos, and novelties. 25
One of the plaintiffs, however, V Secret Catalogue, Inc. owned
the "Victoria's Secret" mark, which was registered in 1981.26 V
Secret Catalogue, Inc. licensed this mark to its subsidiaries who
sold women's lingerie, clothing, and other accessories under that
mark 27 through a variety of trade channels and spent over fiftyfive million dollars on marketing every year. 28 The plaintiffs
also operated over 750 stores, distributed over 400 million copies
of its catalogue each year, and sold its products over the
Internet. 29 In the local area surrounding the defendant's store,
the plaintiffs distributed 39,000 copies of its catalogue yearly
Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
19 Id. at 223 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that proof of dilution under the
FTDA requires proof of an "actual, consummated harm" as established by the
Fourth Circuit (quoting Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464)).
20 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
21 See id. at 476 ("In such a case, proving actual harm would be extremely
difficult... and proof would be limited to the sorts of consumer surveys ....
We
think that both these factors weigh in favor of adopting the Second Circuit's test.").
22 See id. at 476-77 (expounding on the nonexclusive ten factor dilutiondetermining approach of the Second Circuit (citing Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217-22)).
23 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003).
24 See id. at 1124 (concluding that the FTDA "unambiguously require[d] a
showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution").
25 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015); see also V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 259 F.3d at
466.
26 V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 259 F.3d at 466.
27 See id. The other plaintiffs were Victoria's Secret Catalogue, LLC and
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. Id.
28

Id.

29

Id.
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and owned and operated two stores.3 0 Even the defendants
conceded that the plaintiffs mark was extremely well known and
famous. 3 1 After the plaintiffs found out about the opening of
"Victor's Secret," they sent a cease-and-desist letter to the
defendants. 32 Upon the receipt of the letter, the defendants
changed the name of their store to "Victor's Little Secret," but
the plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the defendant's actions and
brought suit in a federal district court. 33 The plaintiffs claimed
federal trademark infringement, unfair competition under
section 43(a) of the Trademark Act, violation of the FTDA, and
34
common law trademark infringement and unfair competition.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants except on the claim based on the FTDA; the Sixth
Circuit reviewed only this claim. 35 The Supreme Court granted
36
certiorari.
Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Stevens first
summarized the decision of the Sixth Circuit. 37 The Sixth
Circuit used the preliminary elements of dilution that it earlier
adopted from Nabisco in its own recent decision, Kellogg Co. v.
Exxon Corp.38 The court supported the idea that one element of
trademark dilution was the distinctiveness of the mark and
stated that "[t]he degree of distinctiveness of a mark governs in

30 Id.

31 Id. at 471 ("In this case, the Moseleys do not challenge the fact that the
Victoria's Secret mark is famous ....
").
32 Id.

at 466-67; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Moseley (No. 01-1015).

Defendant's advertisement in a U.S. Army paper had been faxed to the plaintiff by a
JAG officer. Id.
.13V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 467; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at
4, Moseley (No. 01-1015) ("After receipt of that letter, the Moseleys changed their
business name to VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET and added a design, a pair of lips
with an index finger pressed thereagainst, as if to say 'shhh.' ").
34 V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 259 F.3d at 467.
35 See id.
3 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 535 U.S. 985 (2002).
37 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1120-22 (2003).
38 209 F.3d 562, 557 (6th Cir. 2000); see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d
at 468-69; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; infra Part I.B (describing in detail the
reasoning of the Nabisco decision and the importance of distinctiveness in the
dilution analysis under the FTDA). In order to establish a dilution claim, the
Nabisco test required the plaintiff to show that (1) the senior mark was famous, (2)
it was distinctive, (3) the junior use was a commercial use in commerce, (4) such use
began after the senior mark has become famous, and (5) it caused dilution of the
distinctive quality of the senior mark. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 468-69
(citing Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 577).
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part the breadth of the protection it can command."3 9 The court
held that the Victoria's Secret mark is "arbitrary and fanciful"
because nothing about the Victoria's Secret mark "automatically
conjures thoughts of women's underwear." 40 Since the mark was
"arbitrary and fanciful," it enjoyed the highest level on the
distinctiveness hierarchy and, as a result, deserved the highest
41
level of trademark protection.
The Sixth Circuit resolved the main issue, which was
whether it should align itself "with either the Ringling Brothers
or the Nabisco line of cases" and require the plaintiff to show
actual harm or only the likelihood of dilution. 42
After
summarizing the seminal cases, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
Nabisco test and required the plaintiff to show only an "inference
of likely harm to the senior mark instead of requiring actual
proof."43 The court relied on the legislative history of the FTDA
for support. 44 Following Nabisco, the Sixth Circuit concluded
39 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 469 (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215). The
Nabisco court described in great detail the levels of a mark's distinctiveness and
their effect on the protection that the mark deserves:
At the low end are generic words-words that name the species or object to
which the mark applies. These are totally without distinctiveness and are
ineligible for protection... One rung up the ladder are "descriptive"
marks-those that describe the product or its attributes or claims. These
also have little distinctiveness and accordingly are ineligible for
protection... The next higher rung belongs to "suggestive" marks ...They
are more distinctive than descriptive marks, and thus are accorded

trademark rights ... They are given less protection than is reserved for

more distinctive marks-those that are "arbitrary" or "fanciful."
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-16 (quoting Abercombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
40 V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 259 F.3d at 470.
41 See id. at 469--70.
42 See id. at 472.
43 Id. at 476. This is true, "[d]espite the Fourth Circuit's somewhat persuasive
arguments." Id. at 475.
44 See id. The court quoted the House Report for the FTDA, which defined
dilution as:
[A]n injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox
confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be
debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed
to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1032) (emphasis added). From that excerpt, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
House Report demonstrated Congress's reasons for enacting the FTDA. Id. at 475.
First, the court reasoned that Congress's use of "potency" of the mark necessarily
"demonstrate(d] an understanding that the right to be protected [was] in a mark's
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that the case at hand was "a classic instance of dilution by
45
tarnishing ...and by blurring."
On appeal, the Supreme Court briefly retraced the evolution
of trademark dilution jurisprudence from its humble beginnings
as a branch of traditional infringement law to the present
complexities of the FTDA.46 The Court relied on the legislative
history to demonstrate that Congress intended to include the
actual-harm standard in the FTDA. 47 The Court then compared
the state statutes with the FTDA and concluded that the "text
unambiguously require[d] a showing of actual dilution, rather
Justice Stevens further
than a likelihood of dilution."48
supported that conclusion by referring to the definition section of
the FTDA. 49 In deciding what types of proof would be available
to a plaintiff demonstrating actual dilution, the Court criticized
the Fourth Circuit's suggestion of using revenue reports to
demonstrate actual economic loss.5 0 Instead, the Supreme Court
noted that, while proof of mere mental association was
distinctiveness." Id. at 475-76. Second, the court interpreted the language of the
House Report to signify that Congress intended to provide for a "remedy before
dilution has actually caused economic harm." Id. at 476 (emphasis omitted).
45 Id. at 477. Dilution by tarnishment "occurs when a famous mark is
improperly associated with an inferior or offensive product or service." Panavision
Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204,
209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Dilution by blurring "occurs when a defendant uses a
plaintiffs trademark to identify the defendant's goods or services, creating the
possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the
plaintiffs product." Id. at 1326 n.7 (citing THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:68, at 24-111 (4th ed. 1997)).
46 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23 (2003).
47 See id. at 1123 ("[The] 'purpose of [the FTDA] is to protect famous

trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.'" (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 1029 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029)).
48 See id. at 1124. The state statutes included the "likelihood of harm"
standard, while the FTDA would grant relief only in cases where the use of the
senior mark "cause[d] dilution." Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)
(2000)).
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). This section defines dilution as "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
Id. (emphasis added). The Court stated that "[tihe contrast between the initial
reference to an actual 'lessening of the capacity' of the mark, and the later reference
to a 'likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception' in the second caveat confirms the
conclusion that actual dilution must be established." Moseley, 123 S.Ct. at 1124.
50 Moseley, 123 S.Ct. at 1124.
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insufficient, "other means" such as consumer surveys could be

used. 51 Therefore, since the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
actual harm according to the new standard, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for further
52
proceedings.
Part I of this Note describes the changing landscape of
decisions regarding the FTDA among the circuits, as well as
other jurisdictions, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Moseley case. In Part II, this Note discusses a number of
additional fortifications for the holding in Moseley. Specifically,
this Note analyzes the legislative histories of the FTDA and the
TAA, as well as various policy considerations that support the
inclusion of actual harm into the dilution analysis. This Note
also discusses the availability of administrative proceedings
before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), which the
senior mark holder may use to adjudicate its dilution claim, and
the effect of these proceedings on the actual-harm standard.
Finally, this Note examines various methods of proving actual
harm.
I.

DIVERGENCE OF THE DILUTION ANALYSIS IN THE RINGLING

BROTHERS AND NABIsco DECISIONS

In Ringling Brothers, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff
must show actual dilution in order to prevail in a trademark
dilution claim under the FTDA.53 The Second Circuit refused to
follow the actual-dilution standard imposed in Ringling Brothers
and instead decided that the proper standard should be
likelihood of dilution. 54 The Sixth Circuit's opinion in V Secret
Catalogue may be characterized as a recompilation of these two
decisions by its sister courts. 55

Because the Supreme Court

51 Id. at 1125.
52 Id. The Supreme Court was dissatisfied with the plaintiffs proof because it
"had nothing to say about the impact of [the defendant's] name on the strength of
[the plaintiffs'] mark." Id.
53 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
54 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled
in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
55 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2001), reu'd,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) ("The leading cases are Ringling Brothers, in which the
Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff must provide evidence of actual, present injury

to the famous mark, and Nabisco, in which the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the
Fourth Circuit's more stringent approach.") (citation omitted).
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essentially adopted the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in
Ringling Brothers56 and reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding in V
Secret Catalogue, a decision primarily buttressed by Nabisco, 5 a
detailed discussion of those cases and their progeny will provide
a better insight into the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
5
Moseley. 8
A.

Ringling Brothers and the Actual-Harm Standard

Ringling Brothers began advertising its circus as "The
Greatest Show on Earth" in 1872. 59 In 1962, the Utah Division
of Travel Development ("Utah") began using a trademark "The
Greatest Snow on Earth" to promote Utah's burgeoning winter
tourism industry.60
Both marks were federally registered,
Ringling Brothers' mark in 1961 and Utah's mark in 1997.61 In
1996 Ringling Brothers sued Utah for injunctive and monetary
relief, claiming dilution under the FTDA. The district court
rejected Ringling Brothers' offer of proof, which consisted of a
viewer survey, and found for Utah. Ringling Brothers appealed,
challenging the district court's interpretation of dilution, which
62
required that the plaintiff show actual harm.
Although the Fourth Circuit did not agree with "every
particular" of the district court's interpretation of dilution, it
agreed with "its basic points."63 The court began its reasoning by
64
examining the evolution of the trademark dilution law.
56 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124-25.
57 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 474-76.
58 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir.
2000) (adopting the Second Circuit's interpretation of FTDA definition of dilution);
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 16869 (3d Cir. 2000) (siding with the Second Circuit's position); Westchester Media v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e endorse the
Fourth Circuit's holding that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm since this
standard best accords with the plain meaning of the statute."); Cable News
Network, L.P. v. CNNEWS.COM, 177 F. Supp.2d 506, 521 (E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting
the Fourth Circuit's requirement of actual harm, while disagreeing with its
appellate court's decision in Nabisco).
59 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 451-52.
G2 Id. at 452.
63 Id. at 453.
64 Id. ("The concept of trademark 'dilution'... is commonly traced (though
there were exploratory judicial antecedents) to Frank I. Schechter." (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b. (1995))); see also supra
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Additionally, the court described the various states' antidilution
statutes, particularly the interpretation of those statutes by
their respective state courts. 65 Based on that analysis, the court
concluded that "the most significant feature of the state
antidilution statutes has been their requirement that only a
'likelihood of dilution' rather than actual dilution need [to] be
proved." 66 The court also concluded that the FTDA's definition of
dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services" directly referred to
the "selling power" and hence not the "distinctiveness" of the
mark. 67 Comparing the states' method of dilution protection to
the FTDA provisions, the Fourth Circuit held that the FTDA's
definition of dilution consisted of the following elements: "(1) a
sufficient similarity of marks to evoke in consumers a mental
association of the two that (2) causes (3) actual harm to the
senior marks' economic value as a product-identifying and
advertising agent."68 Applying this actual-harm standard to
Ringling Brothers' evidence, the court concluded that a consumer
survey, which merely aims to demonstrate "instinctive mental
69
association" of the two marks, is insufficient to show dilution.
The Fourth Circuit suggested the types of evidence that might be
used to show such an ethereal concept as dilution. 70 The court
conceded that, while evidence of actual economic loss is the most
probative, a plaintiff will have the hardest time obtaining such
evidence.7 1 The Fourth Circuit examined other alternatives for
the plaintiff, such as a "skillfully constructed consumer survey
designed . . . to demonstrate ... consumer impressions from
72
which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred."
notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
65 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456-57.
(6 Id. at 458.
67

Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).

G8 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 453.

69 Id. at 463.
70 Id. at 464-65. The Fourth Circuit suggested that the senior mark holder
could show actual harm to its mark by using accounting methods demonstrating
economic loss or consumer surveys from which "actual harm and cause might
rationally be inferred." Id. at 464-65 ("Proof will be difficult, because actual,
consummated dilutive harm and its cause are difficult concepts. But the concept is a
substantively viable one, and the means of proof are available."); see also infra Part
II.C (describing in detail various types of evidence that may be used to prove actual
harm).
71 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464.
72 Id. at 465.
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Finally, the court included a non-exclusive list of factors that
might be indirectly relevant to showing dilution, such as the
"junior mark's exposure, the similarity of the marks, [and] the
73
firmness of the senior mark's hold."
A number of other jurisdictions followed the Fourth Circuit's
standard of actual harm. 74 For example, in Cable News Network,
L.P. v. CNNEWS.COM, the Virginia district court concluded
there was no dilution when the plaintiff failed to provide
evidence, such as proof of actual loss of revenues, which Ringling
Brothers suggested was among that most probative of actual
harm.7 5 Likewise, in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit endorsed the
actual-harm standard 76 by distinguishing the FTDA from
various state statutes. 77 The court also criticized the Second
Circuit's decision in Nabisco for failing to follow the plain
meaning of the FTDA.7 8 The Fifth Circuit concluded: "[I]n the
absence of any authority stating that Congress intended a
'likelihood of dilution' standard for the FTDA, [the court] may
79
not depart from the plain meaning of the statute."
B.

Nabisco and the Likelihood of Dilution Standard

In Nabisco, the defendant, Pepperidge Farm, marketed
"Goldfish" crackers beginning in 1962 and subsequently obtained
numerous trademark registrations for the name and appearance
of the crackers.80 In 1998, Nabisco entered into a joint promotion
with Nickelodeon Television Network to market crackers in the
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670

(5th Cir. 2000) (endorsing "the Fourth Circuit's holding that the FTDA requires
proof of actual harm since this standard best accords with the plain meaning of the
statute"); Cable News Network, L.P. v. CNNEWS.COM, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 521
(E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting the Fourth Circuit's requirement of actual harm).
75 177 F. Supp. 2d at 521-22 ("Under Ringling Bros., actual economic harm
may be demonstrated in three ways." (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465)).
76 214 F.3d 658, 670-71; see also Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second
Circuit 1999-2000, 33 CONN. L. REV. 945, 1015 (2001) (noting that the Fifth Circuit
adopted the Fourth Circuit's approach); Rick L. Rambo, Intellectual Property, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 942 (2002) (observing that the Fifth Circuit followed the
Fourth Circuit in requiring proof of actual harm).
7 Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71.
78 Id. at 671.
79 Id.

80 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled
in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:675

shape of characters of a "CatDog" cartoon.8 1
Some of the
crackers were in the shape of a fish closely resembling the
Pepperidge Farm Goldfish. After Pepperidge Farm requested
that Nabisco cease and desist marketing the CatDog crackers,
Nabisco filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that
Nabisco did not violate any of Pepperidge Farm's trademark
rights.8 2 In response, Pepperidge Farm filed a counterclaim
alleging dilution under the FTDA. 83 The district court ruled in
favor of the defendant, applying the likelihood of dilution
The court held that the Goldfish mark was
standard.8 4
"protectable under the antidilution...
statutes"; Nabisco
85
appealed.
The Second Circuit interpreted the FTDA to include
distinctiveness as one of the five elements of dilution. 86 The
court reasoned that distinctiveness "is a characteristic quite
different from fame" and "places marks on a ladder reflecting
their inherent strength or weakness."87 According to that
analysis, a famous mark might be totally indistinctive and hence
not fit within the protection scheme of the FTDA.88 The court
concluded that the Goldfish mark was distinctive enough to
fulfill that requirement. 89
In order to determine if dilution occurred, the district court
applied a six-factor test that Judge Sweet established in his
concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sale , ,U.S.A., Inc.90 The Second Circuit rejected the Mead Data
test 91 and instead adopted a longer, but a similar list of factors:
81
82

Id. at 213.
Id.

83 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff'd, 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
8d Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 214.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 215.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 216 ("A mark that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness is

lacking the very attribute that the anti-dilution statute seeks to protect.").
89 Id. ("[T]he Pepperidge Farm Goldfish mark is... reasonably distinctivecertainly sufficiently so to qualify for the statute's protection.").
90 Id. In Mead Data Central,Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989), Judge Sweet set
forth six factors to be considered in determining dilution: (1) similarity of the marks
(2) similarity of products, (3) sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory intent, (5)
renown of the senior mark, and (6) renown of the junior mark. Id. at 1035-39
(Sweet, J., concurring).
91 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227-28 ("[I]n our view, the Mead Data list, at least as
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(1) distinctiveness; (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of
the products; (4) interrelationship among the distinctiveness,
similarity, and proximity; (5) shared consumers and geographic
limitations; (6) sophistication of consumers; (7) actual confusion;
(8) referential quality of the junior use; (9) harm to the junior
user and delay by the senior user; and (10) the effect of the
senior's prior failure to protect its mark. 92 The Nabisco court
described the list of factors as "nonexclusive" and suggested that
the courts should develop additional factors "gradually over
time" depending on the facts of each particular case. 93 In
applying those factors to the case at hand, the Second Circuit
concentrated on the distinctiveness of the Goldfish mark, the
degree of similarity between the two marks, the close proximity
of the two products, and the low level of consumer
sophistication.9 4 As a result of that analysis, the court concluded
that the defendant demonstrated that "Nabisco's commercial use
of its goldfish shape will dilute the distinctiveness of Pepperidge
95
Farm's ... mark."
The Second Circuit criticized the requirement of proof of
actual harm in Ringling Brothers.96 The court surmised that the
types of proof that the Fourth Circuit proposed, such as revenue
reports or consumer surveys, would be unreliable. 97 The court
reasoned that the causation between dilution and diminished
revenues would be tentative and the senior mark holder could
easily manipulate consumer surveys. 98 Also, the court disagrbed
with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA.9 9 While
the court admitted that a literal reading of the statute would
yield the result reached in Ringling Brothers, it reasoned that

applied to the federal statute, seems to have several deficiencies. First, it
confusingly conflates fame and distinctiveness . . . [F]urthermore [it] fails to include
a number of the factors reviewed above that we believe to be pertinent.").
92 Id. at 217-22. The Second Circuit placed tremendous importance on
distinctiveness in the dilution analysis since it is not only a statutory element but
also one of the factors used to determine if dilution occurred. Id. at 217-18 ("In our
view, distinctiveness plays a dual role.").
93 Id. at 217.
94 Id. at 222.

95 Id.
9G Id. at 223.
97 Id. at 223-24; see also infra Part II.C.
98 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
99 Id.
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such a reading contradicted the intent of the statute. 100 Under
the actual-harm standard, the senior user would not be
adequately compensated and the junior user would not be able to
seek declaratory relief until the injury occurs. 10 1
Other circuits have followed the Nabisco decision and
rejected the Fourth Circuit's standard of actual harm.1 0 2 In Eli
Lilly & Co. v. NaturalAnswers, Inc.,103 the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit found that the Fourth Circuit's standard of
actual proof imposed "an impossible level of proof."'10 4
Consequently, the court held that the likelihood of dilution
standard adequately tracks the "causes dilution" language of the
FTDA, 105 although the Seventh Circuit dismissed several
Nabisco factors in a cursory fashion. 0 6 Additionally, the Third
Circuit, in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
1 08
News, L.L.C.,10 7 applied the Nabisco factors to find dilution.
The court "consider[ed] the dilution analysis in Nabisco
helpful"'0 9 and did not evaluate whether the defendant actually
harmed the plaintiffs mark. 10 It adopted the likelihood of
dilution standard by affirming the district court's decision, which
used a similar standard."'
100Id. ("In our view, however, such a reading depends on excessive literalism to
defeat the intent of the statute."). The Second Circuit believed that the FTDA
drafters intended to grant broad protection to senior mark holders. If an actualharm standard was adopted, the senior mark holder's ability to bring a suit under
the FTDA would be severely limited. This is counterintuitive to the purpose of the
legislation. Id. at 224-25.
101 Id. ("[W]e read the statute to permit adjudication granting or denying an
injunction, whether at the instance of the senior user or the junior seeking
declaratory relief, before the dilution has actually occurred.").
102 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir.
2000) (adopting the Second Circuit's interpretation of FTDA definition of dilution);
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 169
(3d Cir. 2000) (siding with the Second Circuit's position).
103 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
104 Id. at 468.
105 Id. ("It is hard to believe that Congress would create a right of action but at
the same time render proof of the plaintiffs case all but impossible.").
106 See id. at 468-69 (deciding to examine only two factors).
107212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
108 Id. at 168-69.
109Id. at 168.
110 See id. at 169 (agreeing with the district court that actual injury and

irreparable harm need not always be present simultaneously).
M1 See id. at 168-69 (restating the district court's holding that the plaintiff
sufficiently demonstrated the "likelihood that [defendant's] use of [its mark] lessens
the capacity of [the plaintiffs mark] to identify and distinguish [the plaintiffs]
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INTERPRETATION OF DILUTION AS DEFINED IN THE

FTDA, ITS

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND THE UNDERLYING POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS

There are additional compelling reasons that would further
support the Supreme Court's holding in Moseley, such as various
112
portions of the legislative history of the FTDA and the TAA.
The Court did not touch on the role of TTAB proceedings in the
standards used in the FTDA. 1 3
Furthermore, while the
Supreme Court rejected the view of the Fourth Circuit, allowing
evidence in the form of actual economic loss, the Court did not
114
define any cogent "means of demonstrating actual dilution."
A.

The Meaning and Intent of the FederalDilution Legislation

The Supreme Court, by interpreting the statute, concluded
that an actual-harm standard was appropriate. 115 The Court,
however, did not criticize the Sixth Circuit's erroneous
interpretation of the statute, which specifically identified the
distinctiveness of the mark as a premier reason for adopting the
likelihood of dilution standard. 116 In V Secret Catalogue, the
Sixth Circuit attempted to contrast the rights granted to a senior
user through the distinctiveness of a mark with the user's
"property right[s] in gross." 1 7 This distinction is impractical
since a protection scheme based on distinctiveness of a senior
118
mark would grant the senior mark holder unlimited rights
Although Schechter envisioned such protection in , his
revolutionary article on trademark dilution, 119 even the Sixth
Circuit did not adopt it.
The Sixth Circuit conceded that

goods or services" (quoting Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News,
L.L.C., No. 98-CV-5768, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1999))).
112 See infra Part II.A.
113 See infra Part II.B.
114Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124-25 (2003); see
infra Part II.C.
115 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
116 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) (agreeing with the Second Circuit that "[d]istinctiveness is a
crucial trademark concept").
117 Id. at 475.
118 See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 20, Moseley (No. 01-1015)
("[M]anifestly the judgment below creates a dangerous prospect that famous
trademarks will be protected as 'rights in gross,' unlimited as to time.").
119See Schechter, supra note 1, at 828-31 (arguing that fanciful marks should
be given more protection than words of common usage).
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"property right[s] in gross" would extend the reach of the
dilution analysis beyond rational limitations. 120
Thus, if
Congress intended to adopt such an overarching measure, it
would make that intent perfectly clear. 121 Such intent is missing
from the statute, and the mere presence of the word
"distinctiveness" in the text is an example of inaccurate
legislative drafting. 122 Therefore, it appears that, although the
FTDA intended to provide a broad remedy for trademark
dilution, the statute did not advocate a measure that would
adopt a broad standard of likelihood of dilution.
The actual dilution standard is also supported by the
legislative history of the FTDA and the TAA.123 In 1995, when
Congress passed the FTDA, it noted that twenty-five of the
states had "laws that prohibit[ed] trademark dilution." 124 Thus,
Congress was aware of the nuances of the dilution theory,
specifically the state remedies and standards, 25 and as a result,
26
it chose to exclude the "likelihood" standard from the statute.
120 V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 475-76 (defining distinctiveness as
failing to reach the "property right in gross").
121 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e simply cannot believe that, as
a general proposition, Congress could have intended, without making its intention
to do so perfectly clear to create property rights in gross ....).

122 J.

THOMAS

MCCARTHY,

MCCARTHY

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 24:91, at 24-158.5-24-158.6 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that the FTDA's
repetition of "distinctiveness" was included as a result of accidental failure to delete
the word which was an old requirement in trademark registration). McCarthy's
treatise also dismissed "distinctiveness" as a synonym for "fame." Id. at 24-158.6 to
24-161.
123 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 ("The provision is intended to protect famous marks where the
subsequent, unauthorized commercial use of such marks by others dilutes the
distinctiveness of the mark."); H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 5 (1999), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 218, 218-19 (permitting injunctive relief for actual dilution).
124 H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030-31; see also Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670
(5th Cir. 2000) ("There is a key difference between the state antidilution statutes
that formed the backdrop for passage of the FTDA and the FTDA itself.").
125 See Kim, supra note 4, at 753 n.207 (finding that the FTDA was modeled on
state legislation). But see Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 24, Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015) ("Congress intended the FTDA
to stand on its own, apart from the state dilution laws ....
For this reason, the
FTDA must be construed independently from court decisions interpreting pre-FTDA
state dilution statutes.").
126 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 ("Dilution does not rely upon the standard test of infringement, that is,
likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake.").
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The legislative history of the TAA discloses an even clearer
statement of Congressional intent to exclude the likelihood of
dilution standard. 127 Congress was fully aware of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Ringling Brothers,128 yet the TAA is devoid
of any amendments that would instruct the judiciary of
Congressional disapproval. 129 "Generally, when Congress enacts
a statute that has been interpreted by the courts, it is 'presumed
to be aware of ...judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change.'"130 Therefore, by omission, the TAA does not support
131
adoption of the likelihood of dilution as the proper standard.
The legislative history of the TAA is replete with examples that
demonstrate Congressional intent to exclude the likelihood of
dilution standard, but the Supreme Court only considered the
132
legislative history of the FTDA.
B. Availability of Administrative Proceedings in Trademark
Protectionand Their Effect on the Dilution Standards
The majority of this Note has discussed the ability of a
senior user to seek legal protection for its federally registered
mark in the federal courts. Another option for a senior user is to
133 Of
initiate an administrative proceeding before the TTAB.
particular concern is the senior user's option of bringing either
134
an opposition or a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB.
r

1

127 See David L. Orwick, Note, The FTDA's "Causes Dilution" Causing
Problems:Analyzing the Ringling Bros. and Nabisco StandardsAfter the Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1161, 1181 ("[T]he legislative history of
the TAA supports the application of an 'actual dilution' standard."); see diso H.R.
REP. NO. 106-250, at 5 (explaining the standards needed to prove a dilution claim).
128 See 145 CONG. REC. S7, 454 (daily ed. June 22, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("[Alt least one circuit has held that likelihood of dilution is not enough, the
trademark owner must prove actual dilution.").
129 See H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 2-3 (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
218, 218-220 (noting that none of the amendments were directed towards the
judiciary due to disapproval of Congress).
130 In re Application of U.S. for Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287,
297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
131 See H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 2-3 (summarizing the amendments and the
known controversies but not discussing the actual harm or the likelihood of dilution
standards).
132 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
133 See MCCARTHY, supra note 122, at 20-99 (4th ed. 1998)
134See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.101-2.107 (2000) (describing procedures for filing an
opposition, amending the complaint, and answering); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.111-2.115
(describing procedures for filing a cancellation, amending the complaint, and
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An opposition proceeding allows the senior user to block the
registration of a junior user's mark, 135 while a cancellation
proceeding provides the senior user with an opportunity to
cancel a federally registered junior user's mark within a limited
time period. 136 The standard that the TTAB used to evaluate
these proceedings is "likelihood of confusion" based on the factors
established in In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 137 That
standard seems to conflict with the FTDA, which stated that
"'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of . . . likelihood of confusion."138
Nevertheless, the TAA amended the pertinent sections of the
federal trademark law and added dilution as a type of damage
for which a senior user may commence either an opposition or a
39
cancellation proceeding.1

answering).
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2000) ("Any person who believes that he would be
damaged by the registration of a mark upon the principal register... may, upon
payment of the prescribed fee, file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark
Office, stating the grounds therefor.").
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 ("A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating
the grounds relied upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows
by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged.").
137476 F.2d 1357, 1361(1973). The United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals Reports, renamed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1983, stated that the following factors are among those that should be
evaluated when determining likelihood of confusion:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. (2) The
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described
in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark
is in use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-tocontinue trade channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. "impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). (6) The
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. (7) The
nature and extent of any actual confusion. (8) The length of time during
and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without
evidence of actual confusion.
Id. at 1361-62.
1,815 U.S.C. §1127 (emphasis added).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) ("Any person who believes that he would be
damaged... as a result of dilution under section 1125(c) ....") (emphasis added); 15
U.S.C. § 1064 ("A petition to cancel a registration of a mark... may ...be filed as
follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged, including as a
result of dilution under section 1125(c) .. ")(emphasis added).
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There are a number of factors that support the inclusion of
"likelihood of dilution" standard in opposition and cancellation
proceedings. First, the practical purposes of these proceedings
demand a standard that allows the arbiter to determine whether
the junior user's likelihood of harming the senior user in the
future and not whether the junior user has already brought
actual harm. A mark that is in the process of being registered,
or has only been registered for a short time, cannot cause actual
economic harm because it simply has not been used in the
market place. Second, the legislative history of the TAA clearly
indicates that when Congress included dilution in the list of
allowable damages for opposition and cancellation proceedings, it
intended to provide the senior user with the option of preventing
any future harm that might be caused by dilution. 140 The House
Report on the TAA described the purpose of the statute's
amendments as "provid[ing] certainty to competing trademark
interests, before the applicant has invested significant resources
in its proposed mark, and before dilution-type damage has been
1 41
suffered in the marketplace by the owner of the famous mark."
Consequently, a less strict standard, likelihood of dilution, is
appropriate for use in proceedings before the TTAB.
The use of a more stringent standard, actual harm, in the
federal courts is supported by the availability of a more lenient
administrative forum that provides a more flexible weapon
against the junior user. Unlike in an administrative proceeding
before the TTAB where the future damage is merely speculative,
in a regular trademark dilution trial, the senior user has already
suffered the harm; therefore, the senior user should demonstrate
actual harm before the court grants any relief. Furthermore, the
TAA has brought about multiple amendments that grant the
senior user the option of preventing marks that have a potential
to dilute its mark from being registered.14 2 A failure by the
senior user to exercise that option should not be rewarded by a
grant of the availability of lenient standards in all available

140 See H.R. REP. No. 106-250 (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 218; see
also Orwick, supra note 127, at 1178-80 (describing the language, the legislative

history, and the policy reasons as supporting the use of likelihood of dilution
standard during opposition and cancellation proceedings).
141 H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 5-6.
142See 37 C.F.R. § 2.111 (2000) (describing the process for filing a petition for
cancellation).
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forums; 143

therefore, the courts trying FTDA cases should use an
actual-harm standard, unlike the TTAB, which should use a
more lax standard.
C. Methods of ProvingActual Harm
In V Secret Catalogue,the Sixth Circuit contended that proof
of actual harm is nearly impossible to obtain and, as a result,
such a standard is impractical.144 In addition, the Fourth Circuit
stated in Ringling Brothers that "[i]mpossibility or near
impossibility of proving [elements of actual harm] does not
support their judicial presumption."'' 45 Conversely, the Ringling
Brothers court suggested that proof of actual harm might come
in the form of revenue reports, which demonstrate economic loss,
or a "skillfully constructed consumer survey."'146 Although the
Supreme Court has rejected the portion of the Ringling Brothers
opinion that recommended the use of revenue reports, it did not
address the issue of what types of proof the plaintiffs should use
47
in demonstrating actual harm. 1
In Nabisco, the Second Circuit criticized both types of proof
proposed by the Fourth Circuit: the revenue reports and
consumer surveys. 148 The court found that the revenue reports
have two major flaws. 149 First, the actual loss suffered by the
senior user may be impossible to show "no matter how obvious it
was that the junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the
senior."'15 0 Second, if the senior user could demonstrate such
loss, the connection between the dilution of the mark and the
economic loss would be extremely tentative. 151 The Second
Circuit also dismissed surveys as "expensive, time-consuming

143 See Orwick, supra note 127, at 1182 ("[S]enior users that are able to initiate
administrative proceedings before the TTAB but fail to do so should be subject to a
more stringent standard.").
114 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 2001), reu'd,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
145 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999).
146 Id. at 465.
147 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
148 Nabisco, Inc. v. P.F. Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d. Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 224.
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and not immune to manipulation."'15 2 The Supreme Court
rejected that view and stated that "[w]hatever difficulties of
proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for
dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory
53
violation."
Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court doubted the
viability of revenue reports in proving actual harm; however, a
number of jurisdictions and scholars have proposed a variety of
ways to use revenue reports. 154 A revenue report that
demonstrates actual harm would focus on the time period when
the junior user first misappropriated the senior mark. 5 5 The
report would include the revenue figures of both the junior and
the senior users. 56 If the report disclosed "a gradual shift in
revenue" from the senior user to the junior user during the time
period when the junior user began using the mark in dispute,
then there is a showing of dilution of a senior mark.15 7 Thus, the
senior user might be able to show actual economic loss that was
caused by dilution of its mark.
A consumer survey may be more relevant in proving actual
harm because the causation of the dilution is more apparent in
such a survey than in a revenue report. 15 8 The Ringling Brothers
court suggested that such a survey would not only need to
demonstrate "mental association" of the marks at issue but it
would also need to show "consumer impressions from which
actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred."'159 Such
152

Id.

153 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003).
154 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah

Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999) (proposing certain types of

proof that could be used to show actual harm, although the court conceded that such
proof is difficult to obtain).
155 See Kim, supra note 4, at 749-50.
156 See id.; Brent G. Seitz, Case Note, The Actual Harm Requirement and the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Ringling Brothers-Barnum Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT.
L. & POLY 113, 155-56 (1999).
157 See Seitz, supra note 156, at 155-56.
158 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465; see also Patrick M. Bible, Defining and
Quantifying Dilution Under the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey
Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 312-13 (1999)
(describing how to construct a consumer survey that would demonstrate that
dilution has occurred and that it was caused by the junior mark holder's continual
abuse of the senior holder's mark).
159 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465 ("An effective survey, then, must establish
not only that consumers associate the mark with both parties, but also that some
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surveys would obtain responses from two pools of consumers. A
first pool would consist of consumers who have been exposed
only to the senior mark, and a second pool would be composed of
60
consumers who have come in contact with both of the marks.1
The survey would then compare the recognition and association
of the marks by the consumers from both pools. 1 1' Thus the
party presenting the survey as proof could use the survey to
demonstrate the causal connection between dilution of the senior
mark and actual economic loss. In Moseley, the Supreme Court
did not fully explore the options that a well-constructed
consumer survey provides. The Court merely decided that the
evidence used by the plaintiffs was insufficient to support
summary judgment because "[t]here [was] a complete absence of
evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the [plaintiffs'] mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in [plaintiffs']
stores or advertised in its catalogues." 162
CONCLUSION

Based on the legislative history of the FTDA and the TAA, it
is clear that Congress did not intend to make the likelihood of
dilution the standard for evaluating dilution in the federal arena
of trademark protection. Additionally, an administrative forum
is available where a more lenient standard can be used to
adjudicate dilution claims. The existence of such forums dictates
that the trial courts should use a stricter standard of actual
harm. Furthermore, proof of actual harm is not an impossible
undertaking; as demonstrated in this Note, there are various
alternatives for achieving that goal.

quanta of the original mark's identifying ability or selling power has been

diminished." (quoting Bible, supra note 158, at 327-28)).
160See Kim, supra note 4, at 749.
161 Id.
162 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003).

